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Abstract
This paper seeks to elucidate the day-to-day activities comprising the strategy process at the
senior management level as part of a layered discussion. The recent interest in micro-strategy
has stimulated a re-examination of data gathered during an eight-month stay with the senior
management group of one of the larger construction companies in the Netherlands in 1990
and 1991. It emerged that the intended strategy was rarely debated deliberately or openly. If
strategy content was ever discussed, it was usually in an implicit manner while dealing with
other subjects, where the outcome appeared to have a bearing on the strategic direction of
the ﬁrm.
r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The textbook approach to strategic management envisages strategy formation
primarily as a process of deliberate debate and decisive choice. An analysis of the
threats and opportunities posed by the environment, combined with a listing of the
strengths and weaknesses of one’s organization, allegedly fuels the debate in top
management about the appropriate course of action. As soon as the strategy has
ARTICLE IN PRESS
www.elsevier.com/locate/scajman
0956-5221/$ - see front matter r 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.scaman.2004.09.002
Tel.: +31 20 5986811.
E-mail address: h.sminia@mdw.vu.nl.
been formulated, the wheels are supposed to start turning and implementation will
follow.
Over many years the textbook image of strategic management has been reﬁned by
a great many case studies on real-life processes of strategy formation (Bower, 1970;
Child & Smith, 1987; Grinyer & Spender, 1979; Johnson, 1987; Lewis, 1988;
Pettigrew, 1985; Quinn, 1980; Sminia, 1994; Stein, 1993). As a result of these
longitudinal investigations, organizational politics and organizational culture have
both been identiﬁed as making contributions to the realization of strategy, which in
turn has led to a variety of different representations of the strategy-making process
(Chaffee, 1985; Johnson, 1987). Logical incrementalism, for instance, sees strategy
formation as a combination of rational analysis to assess the suitability of strategy
content, and of political activity to make the strategy acceptable to senior
management (Quinn, 1980). When organization culture was added to the process,
strategy formation became portrayed as a process of punctuated equilibrium
(Tushman, Newman, & Romanelli, 1986). Periods of incremental change or
convergence, during which the dominant interpretative scheme remains intact, are
alternated with periods of cultural change or upheavel, during which top manage-
ment’s deﬁnition of the situation is also subject to change (Hinings & Greenwood,
1988; Johnson, 1987). It was Pettigrew (1985, p. 443) who characterized strategy
formation as a process of ‘politics as the management of meaning’: ‘The content of
strategic change is thus ultimately a product of a legitimization process shaped by
political/cultural considerations, though often expressed in rational/analytical terms’.
This view was recently echoed by Maitlis and Lawrence (2003), who saw politics and
discourse as the key elements in the practice of strategy formation.
As a result, there has been some debate between Mintzberg and Waters, Pettigrew
and Butler (in Mintzberg, Waters, Pettigrew, & Butler, 1990) about how best to
study the process of strategy formation. Mintzberg & Waters, Pettigrew and others
such as Hellgren and Lo¨wstedt (1998), and Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, Posada, and
Saint–Macary (1995) have argued that ‘decision-making’ as a concept has ceased to
be fruitful. What they refer to as the ‘choice model’ of strategy formation leads
researchers to pay too much attention to discrete decision points and decision
episodes, while failing to recognize that decisions do not always lead to actions and
that actions may well precede decisions. Others have suggested that the concept of
‘decision-making’ is perhaps more an ordering principle that helps managers to make
sense of their work, rather than an accurate description of what actually happens
when strategies are being formed (Chia, 1994; Hendry, 2000; Laroche, 1995).
Instead, Mintzberg & Waters, and Pettigrew in Mintzberg et al. (1990) argued in
favor of a ‘change model’ of strategy formation, focussing on actions instead of
decisions. Butler in Mintzberg et al. (1990), on the other hand, emphasized the
usefulness of the ‘choice model’ for studying processes of strategy formation, and
urged researchers not to throw away the proverbial baby with the bath water, since
decisions are undoubtedly an important part of organizational life. The ‘choice
model’ has remained a much used conceptualization of strategy formation (e.g. Dean
& Sharfman, 1996; Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992; Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory, &
Wilson, 1986; Nutt, 1984, 2002; Rajagopalan, Rasheed, & Dutta, 1993).
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As well as considering how best to describe and understand strategy formation
processes, interest has also been growing in the actual day-to-day activities that
comprise these processes (Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2002; Johnson, Melin &
Whittington, 2003; Whittington, 1996, 2002). What is thus known as the practice
perspective of strategy asks the question: ‘how [do] managers act and interact in the
whole strategy-making process?’ (Whittington, 1996, p. 732). Some research has been
conducted in the UK focussing on boards of directors. By interviewing non-
executive directors, Pettigrew and McNulty (1995, 1996; McNulty & Pettigrew,
1999) found that boards of directors can be either passive or active, and contrary to
popular belief non-executive directors are able to inﬂuence processes of strategic
choice. Samra-Fredericks (2000a, b, 2003) concentrated on boardroom talk in the
top management group of a UK manufacturing ﬁrm. Observations over a 12-month
period and subsequent analysis revealed that an effective strategist appears to utilize
speciﬁc linguistic skills and forms of knowledge to shape strategic direction.
Jarzabkowski (2003; Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2002) studied the top management
groups of three UK universities. She seeks to explain strategy outcome as resulting
from certain strategic practices that mediate between the actors in the top
management team (TMT), the collective structures of the organizational context,
and strategic activity arising from the process concerned.
The present paper focuses on the day-to-day interactions in which senior
management engages. It represents an attempt to describe and understand what is
happening in what Jarzabkowski (2003) refers to as strategic practices. The concept
of strategic practice has been launched as a central element in the overall practice of
strategic management, but it requires further elaboration if we are to understand
how such an activity actually contributes to a speciﬁc outcome. On empirical
grounds a proposition will be presented characterizing strategic practice as a process
of layered discussion. It will then be argued that it is in this process of layered
discussion that the linguistic skills and forms of knowledge (Samra-Fredericks,
2000a, b, 2003) are deployed. The notion of layered discussion thus allows us to link
day-to-day boardroom talk in the course of strategic practice with the strategy that is
eventually realized. To provide the requisite empirical grounding, data has been
gathered from the process of strategy formation at the Boulden Group1 over an
eight-month period between July 1990 and February 1991. At the time the Boulden
Group was one of the larger construction companies in the Netherlands. This data
enables a description and analysis of the day-to-day activities of the senior
management group of this ﬁrm, and the effects that their activities have had on the
realization of strategy.
2. Layered discussion
As has become apparent from the many case studies of strategy processes, the
interpretative scheme of an organization is inextricably bound up with strategic
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activity (Child & Smith, 1987; Grinyer & Spender, 1979; Hinings & Greenwood,
1988; Johnson, 1987; Lewis, 1988; Pettigrew, 1985; Sminia, 1994; Stein, 1993). For
strategic change to occur the interpretative scheme needs to be modiﬁed, while at the
same time the organization is so bound up in the scheme that it also acts as an
impediment to change. Building on the Luhmannian concept of episode, Hendry and
Seidl (2003) propose a solution for this theoretical dilemma. An episode is deﬁned as
‘a sequence of communications structured in terms of its beginning and ending, for it is
through episodes that organizations are able to routinely suspend their normal routine
structures of discourse, communication, and hierarchy, and so create opportunity for
reflexive strategic practice’ (Hendry & Seidl, 2003, p. 176). Transferred to the realm
of strategic practices, this means that senior management can take a break from their
normal routines by separating themselves deliberately but temporarily from their
day-to-day chores. It is during breaks like this that deliberate debate about the
content of strategy is likely to occur, with the possibility of being able to counter the
thought patterns inherent in the current interpretative scheme. Hendry and Seidl
(2003) cited those occasions when a TMT gathers for a workshop or a review away
from the company at some nice remote spot in the country, as examples of this
Luhmannian type of episode.
There remains the problem of connecting such episodes with the day-to-day
routines of the organization. Points of connection occur at the beginning and the
end of the episode (Hendry & Seidl, 2003). At the beginning, it is a question of how
much of the daily routine is transferred into the episode, while at the end it is a
matter of how much of the outcome of the episode is going to take root in the
organization. Hendry and Seidl (2003), following Luhmann, consider the impact of
an episode—how long its effect is going to last—to be a matter of chance, although
the odds are affected by the manner in which the outcome is communicated in the
larger system.
This elaboration of the Luhmannian concept of episode can be seen as a
further reading of a speciﬁc strategic practice that mediates between strategic
activity, collective structures and TMT actors. Strategic practices are
‘formal operating procedures’. They are ‘ ‘tools’ of interaction and mediation [that]
may be defined as the practices through which strategy is constructed’ (Jarzabkowski,
2003, p. 26). A periodic retreat in the country is one among many of the
formal meetings and procedures. How much of the result of such an episode is going
to take root is determined by what happens in the course of all the other strategic
practices.
Consistent with this view, deliberate and open debate about the intended
strategy took place among the senior management of the Boulden Group during a
few sessions that can be described as ‘episodes’ in the terminology of Hendry and
Seidl (2003). A succession of dedicated meetings, in which an external strategy
consultant took part, resulted in a strategic plan and a new strategy for the
Boulden Group at the end of 1989. It was February 1991 before the Boulden TMT
decided to go into retreat again. On this occasion the 1989 strategic plan was
abandoned and it was concluded that the Group would have to revise its strategy.
Gradually, while following their strategic practices (Jarzabkowski, 2003), senior
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management had come to the point where they felt that abandoning the 1989
strategic plan was inevitable. But, as will be described below, they reached this
conclusion without much open or deliberate debate. It can thus be assumed that
debate on the content of the strategy had occurred in the course of strategic
practices, but not in those terms. Such discussion is regarded as layered. Debate
about strategy content hitches a ride, as it were, while another subject is being
discussed.
Any observer of a strategic practice will be able to see that speciﬁc subjects
are being raised, discussed, and settled again, and that on the surface these
appear to have no bearing on the intended strategy whatsoever. To well-informed
participants however, some speciﬁc subject might have particular implications for
strategy content as well. For these participants, a discussion of this speciﬁc subject
also means discussing strategy. The outcome of such a discussion signals
speciﬁc meaning with regard to the intended strategy. A consistent pattern in these
outcomes creates an effect of lamination (Samra-Fredericks, 2003), producing a
collectively agreed sense of strategic direction without literally, deliberately or openly
debating the intended strategy as such. A skilled participant might even exploit this
effect to their own advantage by raising subjects that have a double meaning, and
simply by discussing such a subject they produce a result at the level of strategy
content.
For layered discussion to occur, two conditions need to be met. First, elements in
the realm of strategy content need to be ambiguous enough to become disputed
when a speciﬁc subject is being raised. This is a necessary condition because
ambiguity provides an opportunity for managers to try out their own readings of the
situation by taking action or signaling their intentions to take certain actions on
speciﬁc issues to see how far they can get. Change in organizations is often
associated with ambiguity (Ericson, 2001; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991). This applies
especially when a Luhmannian-type episode is terminated, and the participants are
most likely to have experienced some alterations to the interpretative scheme. As
Hendry and Seidl (2003) have indicated, ambiguity is present when it comes to the
question of whether or not these alterations are going to take root, once the
participants have returned to their daily routines. Secondly, a conﬂict of
interest should also be present, since as Jarzabkowski (2003) puts it: contradiction
fuels change. This is a necessary condition because managers who take part in
layered discussion only do so because they have a corner to ﬁght. These two
conditions are consistent with a view of strategy process in which politics
and discourse are key elements (Johnson, 1987; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003;
Pettigrew, 1985).
Most of the remainder of this paper is devoted primarily to the empirical
grounding of this interpretation of strategy formation as layered discussion. Three
examples of layered discussion in the top management of the Boulden Group will be
described, as well as the few moments of deliberate debate about the intended
strategy that took place. First, however, the methods of data collection and the data
analysis procedure will be described, and relevant details concerning the Boulden
Group will be given.
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3. Sample and method
The data was originally collected for a case study at the level of what
Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2002) call ‘strategy process research’ (e.g. Pettigrew,
1985; Pettigrew & Whipp, 1991), as opposed to ‘strategy practice research’. Strategy
process case studies of this kind focussed more on the reciprocal relationships
between context, strategy and managerial activity. The results of my original study
were published in Sminia (1994). The idea of layered discussion ﬁrst occurred to me
in the course of the ﬁeldwork. As will be described below, part of the ﬁeldwork
consisted of providing feedback on the implementation process to the top
management team at Boulden. It seemed to me that there was very little
implementation at all, and that this depended on hidden meanings in the way top
management team members dealt with various issues that the subsidiary and
departmental managers then picked up and acted upon. Further, these hidden
meanings appeared predominantly to contradict the letter and the spirit of the
strategic plan. The recent interest in strategy as practice (Whittington, 1996; Johnson
et al., 2003) warrants a re-examination of the Boulden Group case to see whether the
notion of layered discussion could be supported by the available data. Also, with the
publication of the Journal of Management Studies special issue on Micro Strategy
and Strategizing (vol. 40, no. l), it also became possible to ﬁt the concept of layered
discussion into the now available theoretical vocabulary.
At the time when the data was being gathered during 1990 and 1991, the Boulden
Group was a construction company, working mainly in the Netherlands with an
annual turnover of 394.3 million guilders. The company originally grew out of the
construction department of the National Railways. It was made an independent
company in 1969, and adopted the name Boulden in 1972. Since then, the Boulden
Group had taken over one or two other construction companies and was now
working in a number of non-railway-related branches of the industry, although the
National Railways still owned the whole company and were by far its biggest
customer. In the early 1990s, the period between 1969 and 1988 was looked back
upon by the Boulden management as the period of diversiﬁcation. Nevertheless, the
company was being more or less run as a single construction company, ﬁrmly in the
hands of its chief executive. The various subsidiaries were regarded more as
departments reporting directly to the chief executive than as separate construction
companies working more or less independently in different branches of the
construction industry.
By 1988, it was felt that the period of diversiﬁcation was over. This was marked by
the retirement of the then chief executive and chairman of the executive board and
the appearance of his successor at the helm. A process of decentralization was
immediately launched and the subsidiaries were urged to operate as genuinely
separate companies assembled within a holding structure. Senior management also
embarked on the formulation of a new strategic plan, which was completed at the
end of 1989. The new strategy suggested the creation of two separate divisions: a civil
engineering division and a general building division. Each division was supposed to
develop and exploit its own specialist expertise in construction methods and site
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management to provide added value in the market-place and to avoid the price
competition that characterizes tendering practices in the Netherlands. It was the
company’s intention to take advantage of the growing dissatisfaction with
competitive tendering in the industry. The catch-phrase was that Boulden had to
become one of the ‘e´lite’ construction companies in the Netherlands. The separate
subsidiaries were grouped together (on paper) to create the two divisions (see Fig. 1),
while it was considered necessary to acquire more smaller construction companies to
reinforce the available expertise and to build up further capacity. When the data
collection began in July 1990, the Boulden Group had, in their own view, just started
to implement the 1989 strategic plan.
The Boulden senior management group consisted of two hierarchical levels. There
was a four-member executive board that could be considered as the company’s top
management team. Its members were the chief executive who also acted as chairman
of the board, the ﬁnancial manager, the civil engineering sector chief and the general
building sector chief. The last two could also be described as divisional managers
but, as will be explained below, in June 1990 the Boulden TMT had explicitly chosen
to adopt the term ‘sector’ in referring to the two ‘divisions’ mentioned in the 1989
strategic plan.
The next level down was the subsidiary management. Every subsidiary had its own
manager, and a management team ran the major subsidiaries, whereby the
subsidiary manager occupied the position of chief executive for that subsidiary.
During the observation period, the head of the civil engineering sector also acted as
manager of the Boulden Railway Construction subsidiary, while a new manager was
being sought. After the subsidiaries there came four support departments run by
their own departmental heads. Apart from the personnel manager, these depart-
mental heads had more or less the same status as the subsidiary managers. Although
the personnel manager was not counted as a board member, he participated in the
weekly executive board meetings. The Boulden internal consultant was another who
held an exceptional position. Although ofﬁcially a member of the personnel
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department, this person worked freely with Boulden’s senior management and
attended meetings at all levels when the need arose.
Several strategic practices (Jarzabkowski, 2003; Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2002)
were present in the Boulden Group during the observation period. The Boulden
TMT met once a week in the shape of the ‘D4’. The name referred to the four
executive board members, but the personnel manager—who was not a member of
the board—also took part in the board meetings. Sector meetings were also held,
although not at ﬁxed intervals. These were attended by the respective sector heads
subsidiary managers (Fig. 1 shows which subsidiary belongs to which sector). These
sector meetings had been introduced at the beginning of the observation period as a
consequence of the 1989 strategic plan. Finally, there was the biannual ‘Boulden
Management Team Meeting’, at which both hierarchical levels met.
Further, there were two regular procedures during which the Boulden senior
management met. One was the business plan procedure. At the time under discussion
this was a redesigned procedure that was being conducted for the ﬁrst time in its new
guise during the observation period, also as a consequence of the 1989 strategic plan.
Every subsidiary had to write a business plan, which was then going to be reviewed
by the Boulden TMT at a D4 meeting, also attended by the internal consultant for
the occasion. Subsequently, subsidiary management was going to be invited to
discuss the executive board’s judgement on their plan. Parallel with this procedure,
there was an annual budget procedure, during which every unit (subsidiary and
department) had to make an estimate of their costs and proceedings for the next
year. These too were going to be reviewed by the Boulden TMT at a D4 meeting, and
subsequently discussed with the subsidiary and department managers, after which
the budgets for the next year would be set. Additional meetings were arranged on an
ad hoc basis to deal with speciﬁc issues as the need arose.
Direct real-time observation had been conducted at all the above-mentioned
meetings during the eight-month observation period. The data was recorded by
making notes about what was said and by whom. The notes were later transcribed
into interaction sequences, generally within the next 24 h after the meeting. The
interaction sequences were not literal transcriptions of what was said, as this would
have involved taking sound-recording equipment into the meetings. (A sample of an
interaction sequence can be found in Appendix 1.) Apart from the sheer volume of
transcription work that sound-recording would have meant, another aim was to be
as unobtrusive as possible, which taping the meetings would have made very
difﬁcult. This data collection method resulted in abbreviated accounts of what had
been said, focussing on the exact arguments put forward and based on the notes
made during the meetings. Table 1 lists the meetings that I attended as the observer.
These covered the strategic practices mentioned above, as well as three meetings of
the Boulden Railway Construction subsidiary management team. It was these
interaction sequences that provided the raw material on which the proposition of
layered discussion is based.
The original study included other data collection methods besides sitting in on
meetings. Although the additional data that was also collected is available, it has not
been used in the main analysis that was made for the present paper. Thus the
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methods included participant observation by assuming the role of junior internal
consultant in two projects; 18 formal interviews; the collection of ethnographic data
from casual observation, and being on site for four days per week over an eight-
month period; and documenting among other things minutes of the meetings
attended. This involvement has been very helpful when it comes to understanding the
deliberations in the meetings and has provided essential background information
about the goings-on in the Boulden Group, of which the meetings themselves are just
a part. In fact, the background information about the case given in this section is
itself based on data from the various additional data-collection procedures.
The idea behind the original research design had been to seek exposure to an
authentic process of strategy formation, with as little interference as possible from
data collection procedures. Further, the original design had not been structured
according to any preconceived theoretical ideas about how strategy processes are to
be understood (Eisenhardt, 1989). Multiple sources had been used to allow for
triangulation (Jick, 1979), as well providing the breadth of information needed to
appreciate such a complicated and embedded process (Dawson, 1997; Pettigrew,
1990, 1997). As noted above, prior to the analysis made for this paper, a basic idea
about the phenomenon of layered discussion already existed, having stemmed from a
presentation to the Boulden top management group during the observation period.
With the basic idea of layered discussion already in place, what mainly required to be
done was the selective coding of the interaction sequence data to ground the
theoretical concept of layered discussion in these data (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
4. Data analysis
For the purpose of this paper the data that had been collected during the meetings
listed in Table 1 was examined once again. The aim was to indicate those occasions
when the phenomenon of layered discussion could be identiﬁed. The interaction
sequences were organized into text units according to items on the agenda of the
meetings. For this, the original agendas and the minutes of the meetings were both
available as reference material. Each text unit was then coded, indicating the subject
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Table 1
Boulden Group strategic practices
Number of observed meetings
D4 meetings 24
General building sector meetings 4
Civil engineering sector meetings 1
ad hoc meetings 2
Boulden management team meetings 2
Boulden Railway Construction management team meetings 3
Business plan procedure meetings Incorporated in D4
Annual budget procedure meetings 8
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that was being discussed. Initially, the coding followed the original agendas,
but subsequent coding rounds added a few more subjects. Some text units
were also assigned more than one subject code, when interaction sequences
touched upon more subjects than the one supposedly being discussed
according to the agenda. Eventually a total of 157 different subject codes were
established, with each one being separately deﬁned according to what the subject
involved.
This revealed that only 16 subjects were directly related to the Boulden Group’s
intended strategy. These included the only three occasions when the Boulden
strategic plan was actually being openly debated. On another thirteen occasions, the
strategic plan was referred to, but without generating any questioning of the
intended strategy as such. These occasions will all be described below. Selective
coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) in terms of layered discussion was applied to the
remaining subjects. Three subjects were chosen to serve as vignettes to demonstrate
that layered discussion had taken place. These three subjects have been chosen
because they were discussed extensively and popped up at a number of meetings.
They represented major subjects at the time, and involved the three biggest
subsidiaries.
There has of course been a big time lapse between the period of the data collection
and the re-examination of the data on which this paper is based. This applies
particularly to the analysis of the observational data, as potentially there is a
problem about how genuine an interpretation of the data can be after such a long
time. Regarding the categorization described above the interpretative effort was less
demanding as the original agendas and minutes of the meetings were still available as
reference material. The problem is more pressing when it comes to the layered
discussion itself. How accurate can you be with regard to a phenomenon that even at
the time would require intimate knowledge of the situation for you to be able to
observe it had taken place? As it happened, it had been documented at the time—
not, however, for the purpose of writing a scholarly account, but for the purpose of
providing feedback to the TMT about how they were doing with regard to the
implementation of the strategic plan.
As we have seen, a presentation had been made to the Boulden Group TMT in a
D4 meeting on 16 January 1991, at which the personnel manager and the internal
consultant had also been present. The purpose of this presentation had been to
provide feedback on the TMT process. The main message of the presentation was
that the activities of the Boulden TMT members had been counterproductive as far
as implementing the strategic plan was concerned. The presentation had focussed on
the day-to-day behaviors of these people at the meetings, and how this could be seen
to be against both the letter and the spirit of the strategic plan. With this
presentation, a rudimentary form of the notion of layered discussion had emerged.
With the theoretical vocabulary now available, as a result of the interest in strategic
practices (Whittington, 1996; Johnson et al., 2003) and the recent publication of a
Journal of Management Studies special issue (vol. 40, no. 1) on the subject, the point
can be made again, but this time as part of a scholarly debate about micro-strategy
and strategizing.
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5. Deliberate debate on the intended strategy at the Boulden Group
For the Boulden Group to achieve a positions as one of the ‘e´lite’ construction
companies in the Netherlands, a few speciﬁc steps had to be taken. For one, the
organizational routines had to be adapted to accommodate the two divisions in such
a way as to allow the organization to rally round this new management layer.
Consequently it was recognized that a management development program would be
seen as necessary to provide adequate management capacity in the future, and the
internal consultant had been asked to design such a program. And ﬁnally, as we have
seen, a number of acquisitions in both general building and civil engineering were
considered essential to boost capacity and expertise in the Boulden Group.
The executive board produced a management letter in June 1990, introducing a
few amendments to the 1989 strategic plan. This letter also signaled that
implementation of the strategic plan had begun. The most important amendment
in the letter concerned the term ‘division’ in the strategic plan, which was
being abandoned in favor of ‘sector’. Furthermore, two of the executive board
members had now ofﬁcially been appointed as sector heads for general building
and civil engineering respectively. They were expected to lead monthly sector
meetings at which the subsidiary managers were supposed to align their businesses to
each other.
While implementation was supposedly taking place, the intended strategy was
being discussed very little. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant moment occurred at a
meeting on 19 February 1991, nine months after the aforementioned management
letter had been written. The internal consultant asked for some input for the design
of the management development program that he was working on. He especially
asked about the status of the sectors, the possible consequences for the MD-
program, and what the executive board thought about reorganizing the personnel
department along sector lines. The chief executive reacted by declaring that he did
not like the proposal about reorganizing the personnel department. The head of the
general building sector, on the other hand, said that he was sympathetic to the idea.
What happened next was that the ‘sector’ idea was questioned altogether. Almost
immediately the discussion turned towards what would be the best principle for the
division of tasks among the executive board members themselves. The chief executive
said he did not want to stick too rigidly to the original ‘sector’ arrangement as a
guiding principle on this or any other matter. The head of the general building sector
remarked that the original arrangement had been based on the strategic plan. The
chief executive replied that they would consequently need a new strategic plan. Nor
was this conclusion contested by anyone there.
Apart from this instance, there were only four other occasions on which the
content of the plan itself had been debated openly during the eight months
observation period. One of these occurred when the subject of dealing with Inco, the
loss-making concrete repair subsidiary, was discussed at an extra executive board
meeting on 10 October 1990 as part of the business plan procedure. It was concluded
then that Inco was not essential to the success of the strategic plan, so selling this
subsidiary was one of the options.
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Another subject had featured on three occasions of deliberate debate about the
intended strategy, namely the question of dealing with the home-building subsidiary
O’Reilly’s, the other loss-making enterprise. On 28 August 1990 it had been brieﬂy
mentioned that the possibility of selling O’Reilly’s could be motivated on the
grounds that the subsidiary did not ﬁt the current strategy. Nevertheless, on 6
September 1990, the head of the general building sector pointed out that getting rid
of O’Reilly’s would call for a reconsideration of the strategic plan, since home-
building expertise had been regarded as essential expertise to the Boulden Group,
and with the sale of O’Reilly’s this expertise would be lost. The civil engineering
manager pointed out that with the acquisitions that were being planned, home-
building expertise could be re-introduced into the Group. Finally, answering a
question about the importance of home-building to the Boulden strategy during the
general management meeting of 6 February 1991, the chairman stated that the status
of home-building as a core activity was now regarded as more or less obsolete, but
without specifying why.
Looking through all the subjects that were discussed at the various meetings, it
appears that the Boulden strategy was mentioned from time to time, but even on
these occasions the intended strategy only served as a point of reference for
discussing the issue itself and did not become a topic as such. There were ﬁve
subjects where this occurred: the Europe 1992 uniﬁcation, the search for acquisi-
tion candidates in general, the suitability of a speciﬁc candidate in particular, the
ﬁnancial consequences of the strategic plan, and the possibility of international
expansion.
6. Layered discussion and strategy formation in the Boulden Group
The few occasions described above were the only times when the Boulden strategic
plan itself was actually debated deliberately and openly at a senior management
level. It amounted altogether to a few brief moments spread over a period of eight
months. There was eventually a clear statement by the chief executive that Boulden
was in need of a new strategy, nine months after the management letter that marked
the start of the implementation of the old strategy had been sent out. However, a
look at the course of events as regards a number of other subjects that had been dealt
with during this eight-month period, reveals that instances of layered discussion had
been occurring regularly. In view of this, it came as no surprise to ﬁnd that the
original intended strategy had been abandoned.
As has been indicated, for layered discussion to occur, some ambiguity and some
conﬂict of interests need to be present. The 1989 strategic plan that resulted from a
particular episode had introduced ambiguity into the company, concerning the way
the content of the plan was going to affect the daily routines. Moreover, the June
1991 management letter had introduced the concept of the ‘sector’ to the Boulden
Group senior management in place of the concept of the ‘division’. And apart from
signaling some reluctance with regard to the Boulden Group strategic plan, the
meaning of the term had not been made exactly clear either. As it stood then, ‘sector’
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could be interpreted as an entity in the Boulden Group organization structure,
replacing the subsidiary with regard to several tasks and responsibilities that had
been placed at subsidiary level during the earlier decentralization effort.
Alternatively, it could be seen as an additional management layer to which
subsidiary management had to report, while the sector chiefs in turn had to
report to the executive board, and the actual tasks and responsibilities
remained predominantly at the subsidiary level. Or the term might refer to no more
than the regular sector meetings that were going to be held between subsi-
diary managers and the respective sector chiefs to discuss matters of mutual
interest.
Even the concept of the ‘subsidiary’ had become blurred. The meanings of both
‘sector’ and ‘subsidiary’ were interdependent. The more autonomy the subsidiaries
were going to be granted, the more difﬁcult it would become to pool them together in
a sector. The more a sector gained in prominence over a subsidiary, the less
autonomously a subsidiary could afford to act. Further, different interests had also
been at stake, connected with which of the organizational entities would become
dominant. There had been differences in the power and prestige of speciﬁc
individuals as well as different opinions about what would be the best option for the
Boulden Group as a whole, or for a part of the Boulden Group for which a
particular manager was held responsible. To sum all this up, the ambivalence and
corresponding conﬂict of interests at this time can be expressed as follows. Is the
Boulden Group going to develop into a federation of largely independent
subsidiaries, with each one working in its own niche in the building trade? Or is
the Boulden Group going to be managed as a two-division ﬁrm, where one division
works in civil engineering and the other in general building, as was intended in the
strategic plan?
As this was the situation at the beginning of the observation period, layered
discussion can be expected to have assumed the following form. Whenever a
subject is raised that has implications with regard to the meaning of the ‘sector’ or
the ‘subsidiary’ idea, this will immediately have implications for strategy
content. The intention of becoming one of the ‘e´lite’ construction companies in
the Netherlands was closely intertwined with the question of how the Boulden
Group was going to be managed. As it turned out, particular subjects were being
discussed, while at the same time an undercurrent of various meanings for the
sector and/or subsidiary idea were also part of the deliberations. These alter-
native meanings were rarely discussed openly. Nevertheless, the way these
particular subjects were settled and which deﬁnitions of the ‘sector’ and ‘subsidiary’
were coming to dominate as a result, would have an impact on the strategic direction
of the ﬁrm. Debate about strategy content does thus occur, but in a concealed
manner.
Three examples are described below. The subjects chosen are the future of the
Boulden Construction Projects subsidiary, the future of the Boulden Concrete
Construction subsidiary, and crane runways at the Boulden Railway Construction
subsidiary. Presented below are summaries of the interaction sequences that were
recorded at the time.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
H. Sminia / Scand. J. Mgmt. 21 (2005) 267–291 279
6.1. The future of Boulden Construction Projects
 At the end of an executive board meeting on 28 August 1990, the head of the
building sector mentioned that Construction Projects was growing too big, and
because the acquisitions were taking their time, subsidiary management was busy
devising plans to start a branch ofﬁce in the Rotterdam area. The CEO pointed
out that one of the acquisition candidates was also located in Rotterdam and
asked whether Construction Projects management had thought about other areas
in the Netherlands. After discussing possible locations he concluded that this plan
had at least been a useful thought experiment, implying that branching out did not
meet with his approval.
 While discussing the Construction Projects business plan at the extra executive
board meeting on 1 October 1990, the CEO startlingly asked if they were serious
about establishing branch ofﬁces in different parts of the Netherlands. On
receiving conﬁrmation that this was actually the case, the CEO stated ﬁrmly his
disapproval of the idea as it went against the strategic plan.
 During the review of the Construction Projects’ annual budget on 15 November
1990, the plan to establish branch ofﬁces was not mentioned. (After the meeting,
when I asked the Construction Projects manager what had happened to his plan,
I was told that said the costs were being provided for in the budget.)
 When the Construction Projects manager presented his subsidiary to his
colleagues at the biannual BMT meeting on 6 February 1991, he declared his
intention of opening branch ofﬁces, although he realized this went against
the wishes of the executive board. The CEO was present but did not speak out
against it.
Discussing the future of Boulden Construction Projects had been a conversation
about opening or not opening branch ofﬁces. Simultaneously, the Construction
Projects manager had been steering towards more autonomy for his own subsidiary,
and eventually got away with it. For him, ‘sector level’ had little meaning, and he
acted in accordance with the deﬁnition of the Boulden Group as a federation of
largely independent subsidiaries, whereby each subsidiary worked in its own niche in
the building trade. Initially he was rebuked by a reference to the 1989 strategic plan,
but this did not deter him from his view of the future. Although the pros and cons of
branching out in relation to the 1989 strategic plan were never actually debated, the
reins were ultimately slackened when the Construction Projects manager obtained
passive permission at the biannual Boulden management team meeting in February:
the CEO raised no objections and chose to keep quiet. This also indicated that the
strategic plan had fallen into the background, as this permission meant that Boulden
was coming to resemble a federation of subsidiaries rather than a two-division ﬁrm.
6.2. The future of Boulden Concrete Construction
 While discussing the Concrete Construction business plan at the extra executive
board meeting on 1 October 1990, executive board members debated how this
ARTICLE IN PRESS
H. Sminia / Scand. J. Mgmt. 21 (2005) 267–291280
plan should be interpreted. The heads of the building sector and of the civil
engineering sector pointed out that Concrete Construction did not explain how
they were going to extend their customer base beyond the National Railways, as
had been agreed. The internal consultant explained that the Concrete Construc-
tion manager could not be expected to deal with this problem in the business plan
for two reasons. First, part of the solution depended on the acquisition of a
particular company that Boulden was currently targeting. Because of the
conﬁdential nature of this operation, it could not be discussed openly while the
business plan was being formulated. Secondly, targeting the non-railways market
depended on how the civil engineering sector was going to be ﬂeshed out. A big
proportion of this subsidiary’s capacity was tied up in large combination projects2
on a scale that required handling at the sector level. Further, non-railway
commissions where Boulden would have a chance were expected to be mainly of
this magnitude. The Concrete Construction subsidiary was simply waiting for
directions from the executive board. The internal consultant concluded by saying
that the business plan was simply a cry for more clarity in this matter. The CEO
declared his intention to discuss the status of the civil engineering sector in the
near future.
 During the review of the Concrete Construction annual budget on 13 November
1990, the CEO asked how the business plan had affected the budget. A
representative of Concrete Construction replied that no deﬁnite choice had been
made, as the status of the civil engineering sector was still unknown, and the
current state of affairs was simply being projected onto the future (the subsidiary
manager was not present because of illness). The head of the civil engineering
sector asked whether the projected turnover in non-railway business was being
backed by real prospects. The answer was that there were no clear prospects. The
CEO explained that the projected turnover must be interpreted as the setting of a
task. He added that further discussion would be difﬁcult because of the subsidiary
manager’s absence.
 When the Concrete Construction manager presented his subsidiary to his
colleagues at the BMT meeting on 6 February 1990, he explained that his
subsidiary was difﬁcult to manage because half its capacity was tied up in big
combination projects over which he had no control.
 At a regular executive board meeting on 20 February 1990 (one day after the
extraordinary executive board meeting during which the sector as an entity in the
Boulden organizational structure was abolished), the head of the Building Sector
suggested a dedicated marketing plan, to formulate the way Concrete Construc-
tion was going to acquire non-railway business.
Concrete Construction management continued to stick with the original sector
idea as envisioned in the strategic plan, but they were told off. Their dealings with
the executive board on issues such as the annual budget, their marketing effort, and
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site management were all marked by a constant plea for ﬂeshing out the civil
engineering sector. They favored a future in which they would be part of a strong
civil engineering sector instead of working on their own. In response to this, any
discussion on the issue was avoided, and the idea of extending their customer base
beyond the National Railways became a way of discussing the future of this
subsidiary. This response contained the message that things had to be sorted out at
the subsidiary level. The sector and subsidiary concepts were thus acquiring
particular meanings that were not in accordance with the intentions of the strategic
plan. Again the image of Boulden as a federation of subsidiaries was gaining
precedence over the image of the two-division ﬁrm.
In both these examples—Construction Projects and Concrete Construction—
ambiguity regarding the role of the two sectors played a part. A haggling game with
different interpretations of the ‘sector’ idea was played out between the participants.
To serve their own interests and ambitions, people made commitments and signaled
intentions with speciﬁc interpretations of this idea in mind, to see how far they could
go, or to get some clarity on the expected state of affairs. This last had been in the
minds of both the Concrete Construction manager and the internal consultant when
the future of the subsidiary was being discussed. Seeing how far he could go had been
the game of the Construction Projects manager.
To sum up, in both examples layered discussion assumed the following shape.
While discussing the future of two large subsidiaries, the Boulden strategy for
becoming one of the ‘e´lite’ construction companies in the Netherlands had barely
been mentioned. Instead, discussion on the future of the two subsidiaries had turned
into a dispute about opening branch ofﬁces and extending the customer base beyond
the National Railways, respectively. The arguments on these matters had signaled
speciﬁc meanings regarding the sector and subsidiary concepts and in doing so had
touched upon the content of the 1989 strategic plan. Neither these meanings nor the
link-up with the strategic plan had been debated deliberately or openly. Nevertheless,
the implications became clear enough; the disputes had been settled against the
intentions of the 1989 strategic plan, contributing ultimately to an uncontested
conclusion at the special D4 meeting in January 1991 that Boulden now had to come
up with a new strategic plan.
6.3. Crane runways at Boulden Railway Construction
 During the extra board meeting on 1 October 1990, when the Boulden Railway
Construction business plan was reviewed, the CEO asked why this plan showed so
little initiative. He also wondered why this subsidiary did not seem to put any
effort into market development, and mentioned in passing the possibility of crane
runways3 as an example. The head of the Building Sector echoed this query. The
head of the Civil Engineering Sector, who also ran the railway construction
subsidiary, explained that the future of railway construction was determined by
the National Railways and that the Boulden railway activities are very much tied
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up with the National Railways organization. In his opinion, this meant there was
not much room for initiative.
 The comments of the executive board were discussed at the Railway Construction
management team meeting on 15 October 1990. The head of the Civil Engineering
Sector relayed the board’s opinion regarding this subsidiary’s lack of initiative.
The management team members then discussed various possibilities whereby
Railway Construction could expand into adjoining market segments. Somebody
mentioned crane runways and the head of the Civil Engineering sector picked up
on that, saying this had also been mentioned at board level, and asked if Boulden
had the capability for laying crane runways. The answers were mixed, some
explaining that it required a different technology and others sounding more
optimistic. Somebody asked whether a subsidiary had the authority to make this
kind of decision, or if board approval was required. The sector head replied that
they could take decisions of this kind at the subsidiary level. He ended the
discussion by saying that an investment sum must be included in the annual
budget for ﬁnancing the development of crane runways as a new Boulden Railway
Construction activity.
 At the next management team meeting, on 29 October 1990, the business plan was
ﬁnally assessed, with a view to developing crane runways as an extra activity for
Boulden Railway Construction.
 On 5 November 1990, the management team compiled the ﬁnal version of the
annual budget, which included initial expenses of 200,000 guilders for crane
runways.
 The Boulden Railway Construction annual budget was discussed with the board
at a special meeting on 12 November 1990. The chief executive and the ﬁnancial
manager focussed on the question as to why the budget did not meet the ﬁnancial
targets previously set by the board. The subsidiary management tried to explain
that the results as presented in the annual budget were what they had thought were
feasible. The initial expenses for crane runways were only mentioned when they
were being dismissed by the CEO as a small detail with regard to the difference
between the targets and the projected results.
 During the biannual BMT meeting on 6 February 1991 the head of Civil
Engineering, in his capacity as Railway Construction manager, presented this
subsidiary as one that was taking an active stance, introducing crane runways as
the ﬁrst new venture.
This example offers another clear illustration of the way the term ‘subsidiary’ took
on a speciﬁc meaning. Boulden subsidiaries were expected to make their mark in
their respective branches of the building trade. No possible contribution by the
Railway Construction subsidiary to the civil engineering sector had ever been part of
the discussions. Rather, making ends meet in the annual budget, and crane runways
as a separate subject altogether, came to stand for the displaying of this subsidiary as
one of the semi-autonomous members of the Boulden federation of subsidiaries, and
not as a contribution on the part of one of the two Boulden divisions. Again the
intentions of the strategic plan vanished into the background.
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Thus, not only in this example but also in the two described earlier, layered
discussion was taking place. Speciﬁc subjects had been discussed on a number of
occasions. In discussing these subjects the meaning of the sector and subsidiary
concepts had also been questioned, albeit mainly in a concealed manner. It was this
controversy that also signaled controversy about the strategic plan itself, but without
anything being explicitly noted during the deliberations. Based on the frequent
emphasis the CEO gave to the importance of the subsidiary as the focal point in the
Boulden Group organization structure at the expense of the sector, it came as no
surprise when the strategic plan was ultimately dismissed by a simple remark during
a discussion about the division of tasks between the executive board members at the
meeting on 19 February 1991.
These are only three of several examples during which layered discussion could be
observed. The ambiguity of the ‘sector’ and ‘subsidiary’ idea had been part of the
deliberations in this way on other occasions too. For instance, this ambiguity had
been ever-present in the recently established periodic sector meetings, which
eventually proved to be no more than noncommittal talks. Further, the head of
the drawing and design ofﬁce had been asked to develop a policy plan for his
department, based on the strategic plan. (The present author acted as junior
consultant in this project.) The head proposed a few alternative directions,
depending on how the sectors were going to take shape, but could not get the
executive board to commit themselves to any of his proposals. Layered discussion
was also present on numerous other subjects, with the idea of ‘subsidiary’ being
frequently re-conﬁrmed as referring to a fairly autonomous organizational entity
that was expected to take care of its own business. This had been the way in which
subsidiary management had been addressed during the business plan and annual
budget procedures. This interpretation of the sector and subsidiary concepts had
informed the executive board in their treatment of the loss-making subsidiaries Inco
and O’Reilly’s.
7. Discussion and conclusion
The data presented here on the Boulden Group case indicates that over a period of
eight months very little open or deliberate debate occurred about strategy content,
although the period opened with a management letter stating that implementation of
the strategic plan had started, and closed with a meeting at which the CEO
announced that the plan needed to be reformulated. Nevertheless, if we view the
situation in a layered-discussion perspective we ﬁnd that debate about strategy
content did occur quite regularly but hidden within discussion on other subjects. The
talk about the future of the Boulden Construction Projects and the Boulden
Concrete Construction subsidiaries, and about crane runways at Boulden Railway
Construction, can all three be interpreted simultaneously as discussions about the
strategic direction of the Boulden Group as a whole. There were messages about the
meanings that were going to be attached to the terms ‘subsidiary’ and ‘sector’. The
outcomes of the three discussions all went counter to the content of the strategic plan
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previously agreed upon, as the meanings that became attached to these two terms
indicated that the Boulden Group was going to be not a two-division ﬁrm but a
federation of subsidiaries. It has also appeared that the outcomes of discussions on
many other subjects contained a similar message. So it came as no big surprise to the
Boulden management that the Boulden Group strategic plan was dismissed only
eight months after its implementation had begun, although the intended strategy had
scarcely been debated openly or deliberately. This case thus lends empirical support
to the proposition that layered discussion takes place in strategic practices
(Jarzabkowski, 2003).
One implication of the layered discussion concept is that the Luhmanian episode,
as described by Hendry and Seidl (2003), is not the only solution for handling the
interpretative scheme in the strategy-formation process. As previous strategy
process research has shown, the interpretative scheme of an organization is bound
up with its strategic activities (Child & Smith, 1987; Grinyer & Spender, 1979;
Hinings & Greenwood, 1988; Johnson, 1987; Lewis, 1988; Pettigrew, 1985;
Sminia, 1994; Stein, 1993). The interpretative scheme has been found to be an
impediment to strategic change as well as being itself the object of such change.
Hendry and Seidl (2003) introduced the notion of the Luhmanian episode as a
way of dealing with this (theoretical) dilemma, whereby a TMT deliberately
separates itself from the daily routines for a short period, with the result that thought
patterns inherent in the current interpretative scheme might perhaps be countered.
Workshops or review sessions organized away from the ofﬁce are examples of
strategic practices (Jarzabkowski, 2003) involving such Luhmanian episodes. The
idea of the layered discussion, on the other hand, implies that the interpretative
scheme can also be played about with in the context of the daily routines. Layered
discussion thus has some resemblance to Goffman’s concept of ‘keying’ (Goffman,
1975).4
‘Keying’ is a ‘process of transcription’ whereby a ‘key’, being ‘a set of conventions
by which a given activity, one already meaningful in terms of some primary framework,
is transformed into something patterned on this activity but seen by the participants to
be something quite else’ (Goffman, 1975, pp. 43–44). In the layered discussion
described above, some form of ‘keying’ is occurring that, for instance, talk about the
Boulden Railway Construction subsidiary venturing into crane runways turns into a
discussion about the meaning of the terms ‘sector’ and ‘subsidiary’, and thus into a
discussion about the Boulden Group’s intended strategy. In this way, the
participants play around with the meaning of two terms that are central to the
interpretative scheme of this organization, and that they do so as part of their daily
routines.
Goffman (1975) sees ‘keying’ is a common phenomenon that is part of everyday
life. Social interaction is often accompanied by layers of meanings, centered around
what he calls an untransformed activity that is understood in terms of a primary
framework and that can be ‘keyed’ in terms of various other frameworks that are
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recognized by the participants as also being relevant. He assumes further that the
participants know what ‘key’ the activity is to be understood in and will report on it
in terms of what they think is really going on. If for some reason one or more
participants induce the others into nursing a false belief about what is going on, he
then prefers the term ‘fabrication’ to ‘keying’. These transformations occur for ‘fun,
deception, experiment, rehearsal, dream, fantasy, ritual, demonstration, analysis, and
charity’ in order to ‘confirm a frame-relevant view of the workings of the world’
(Goffman, 1975, pp. 560–563).
Goffman’s main question concerns the way reality is being experienced. Strategy
formation is not only about experiencing reality but also about shaping it for the
future. In the Boulden Group case and in the research case reported in Samra-
Fredericks (2000a, b, 2003), strategic direction is being shaped through layered
discussion. In the Samra-Fredericks case, for instance, it was found that when the
TMT was talking about the work of IT analysts and programmers, the discussion
was interpreted as dealing not only with the IT function of the ﬁrm concerned, but
also as having implications for the ﬁrm’s strategy—although this was never explicitly
referred to at the time. The linguistic skills and forms of knowledge she discovered
were being skillfully employed by one particular TMT-member who was able to
channel the discussion of certain issues in such a way as to laminate them into a
speciﬁc strategic direction for the ﬁrm, but with only a limited amount of deliberate
open debate about strategy content. In the Boulden Group case, too, talk about a
variety of issues generated particular meanings for the concepts of ‘subsidiary’ and
‘sector’ that in turn had a direct impact on the status of the strategic plan. However,
it is doubtful whether the clear distinction between ‘keying’ and ‘fabrication’ in
Goffman (1975) can be maintained here, since speciﬁc skills (Samra-Fredericks,
2000a, b, 2003) are required of the participants if they are to be able to take part in
the process. It cannot thus be automatically assumed that every participant is aware
of which ‘key’ the process is taking place in.
Strategic practices are often based on speciﬁc strategic-management tools.
Budgeting and planning, for instance, are regular activities in which top management
engages. The annual budget, the strategic plan, quarterly reviews—all these provide
what Goffman (1975) would call a primary frame of reference in the shape of the
budget, the plan, or the quarterly results. Given that layered discussion is taking
place throughout all these activities, strategic practices are also ‘keyed’ to speciﬁc
questions, dilemmas or controversies associated with the interpretative scheme of the
organization. It is in this way that a continual debate about the strategic direction of
the ﬁrm takes place, albeit in a partially concealed manner. A Luhmanian episode
like a strategy review away from the ofﬁce (Hendry & Seidl, 2003) is thus a strategic
practice where the interpretative scheme of the organization is the primary frame of
reference, and consequently it is one of the rather rare occasions when the intended
strategy is openly debated.
Interestingly enough, the Boulden Group case also demonstrates a connection
between strategy-as-practice (Whittington, 1996) and organization-structure-as-
practice (Whittington, 2002). As has been noted above, strategy-as-practice focuses
on the strategists themselves and on the way their day-to-day interactions constitute
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their acts of strategizing. In the present paper layered discussion has been regarded
as a characterization of such daily strategizing acts. The structure-as-practice
approach looks at the role of practitioners in making organizational structures work,
which involves everyday maintenance as well as adjustments and manipulation. In
the case described here, layered discussion about the suitability, feasibility and
acceptability of the Boulden Group strategy to be one of the ‘e´lite’ construction
companies in the Netherlands was hidden in ambiguities centering around terms
concerning organization structure. It was the structural terms ‘sector and
‘subsidiary’ that were contested. Furthermore, much of the dispute focussed on
the role of the executive board and the relationship between board-level and
subsidiary-level management. As it turned out, the term ‘sector’ came to refer not to
an organizational entity or a management layer in the Boulden Group organization
structure. It simply came to denote the monthly meetings at which subsidiary
management sat down with their respective sector heads. Ironically, this conﬁrmed
the term of ‘subsidiary’ once again as referring to a semi-autonomous entity in the
Boulden Group scheme of things. In this case it was the manner in which these two
structural terms were given everyday meaning in Boulden’s daily practice, that both
describes and explains the day-to-day strategy formation at senior management
level.
When it comes to the debate about the best way to study the process of strategy
formation, the concept of layered discussion seems to ﬁt better with the ‘change
model’ than with the ‘choice model’ (Mintzberg et al., 1990). It offers a speciﬁc
reading of the pattern of activities whereby strategic direction takes shape. The focus
is on the activities that take place within the strategic practices (Jarzabkowski, 2003;
Jarzabkowski & Wilson, 2002). One important insight to emerge is that strategy as
such cannot be easily distinguished from the day-to-day running of the ﬁrm since it
can in fact be part of every subject that senior management has to deal with. Thus,
for practicing managers, executives and directors, a speciﬁc requirement in
conjunction with the speciﬁc linguistic skills and forms of knowledge proposed by
Samra-Fredericks (2000a, b, 2003) is an ability to ‘read between the lines’, to pick up
on the various layers of meaning that are inherent in every discussion, to be able to
make a contribution. This immediately brings up the question of transparency.
Given that layered discussion as such is probably unavoidable, the question arises as
to how much implicit debate about strategy is acceptable? An additional task would
then be the monitoring of strategic practices to insure that deliberate debate does
take place sufﬁciently often.
To sum up, recognizing that strategic direction shaped at senior management level
by way of layered discussion, means that ‘keying’ must be seen as an essential part of
the process. With this acknowledgement, the pivotal role of the interpretative scheme
in strategy formation remains in place, with layered discussion providing the means
by which meaning is changed or maintained. Effective strategic management as the
management of meaning then becomes the management of keying. For a manager,
to be inﬂuential requires either knowledge and the use of available keys to steer
discussion in a certain direction, or the ability to fabricate new keys to expand the
range of possibilities whereby layered discussion can take place. This also implies the
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existence of multiple frames of reference surrounding strategy formation at the top
management level. Some of these frames are widespread and generally recognized
among the management population. They include such things as the theories and
tools that can be learned at business schools, the professional standards attaching to
particular occupations or the strategic recipes (Spender, 1989) typical of certain
industries. Other frames are extremely local, having developed from a speciﬁc
company history, an organizational culture or a very particular shared experience.
What can be expected is that the more widespread frames act as primary frames of
reference, while local frames provide secondary frames of reference into which the
‘hidden layer’ in layered discussion is then keyed. Strategy tools then become a
means for discussing something else. It is not the tool itself that provides meaning
and understanding. The debate is about the frame of reference into which the
particular discussion is keyed. Consequently, people such as outside strategy
consultants who are not familiar with the situation are generally unaware of the local
keys, and are thus only able to contribute in terms of the more general frames of
reference that they share with local management. Another possibility is that if
these outside consultants are particular effective, they may be the means
whereby a new frame of reference is introduced into which local frames then can
be keyed, thus extending the range of the strategy debate that takes place. Finally, an
outside researcher of strategy-formation processes at the senior management level
should also be aware of the various frames of reference that surround the
local strategy debate if they are to be able to gather what is going on.
Ethnographic methods are thus essential to the study of the strategy process at
the top management level.
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Appendix 1. Example of interaction sequence
D4 meeting on 21 November 1990, 9.30–12.30, item 9 on the agenda
(9) Attribution Personnel Department annual budget
[CEO announces that there are protests about cost increases at pd and that nobody
recognized this in more pd activity]
PM X of course has only been recently in service and nobody has noticed
that yet.
CEO Yes but one says that one did not ask for more activity.
PM There is Group policy in it too.
CEO One does not get the feeling one gets more. We arrive here at a more
fundamental discussion.
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PM There are even more worrying noises. One doubts the quality of pd.
One expects more attention.
CEO That is not the point. It is the principle. Last year everybody agreed on
how much I get for how much money. Now one has to pay
considerably more without getting more.
PM There has been temporarily subsidization by the Group.
HCES One does not recognize the on-charged expenses. That is the
problem.
PM But there is more time available now.
HGBS I think there are three things. The method of charging-on deviates
from last year. Then subsidizing was the case.
FM Subsidizing has been abolished two years ago.
HGBS Oh. But secondly, one does not recognize the amounts of time spent
as indicated by pd. And thirdly, the popularity of the club. At
Moreton they have employed their own personnel ofﬁcer of which
H says that she is better and cheaper. T would like to have his own
pd as well for his construction personnel. You should feel for that
more.
FM As a girder functions of course the social and personnel policy. If that
is accepted, the amounts do not pose a problem. There should be
consensus about what pd thinks what amount of time should be spend
and what the subsidiaries want that pd should spent. This discussion
still needs to be pursued.
PM There are two things. The expectations of the subsidiaries need to be
expressed. But there are also a number of things as a consequence of
Group policy.
CEO [interrupts] Three years ago I had already warned you that you should
do something about your internal PR.
[PM
mutters]
CEO My proposal is to force through the current amounts and that
consensus should be reached about expectations before February 1st.
That means a passing maneuver for the internal PR.
HCES Maybe there should be some timekeeping for a period of three months
to enter the discussion on the basis of that information. February 1st
seems early for me.
HGBS February 1st looks ambitious for me too.
CEO I want the talks started before February 1st.
HGBS Maybe through the sector?
[remarks about the issues being to subsidiary speciﬁc]
FM And then based on the existing social and personnel policy.
HGBS Yes, yes.
PM [announces he already had talked with R about a review of pd
operations and that he will place this review in this context]
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pd ¼ personnel department
CEO ¼ Chief Executive / PM ¼ Personnel Manager / HCES ¼ Head of Civil
Engineering Sector / HGBS ¼ Head of General Building Sector / FM ¼ Finance
Manager / X ¼ speciﬁc personnel ofﬁcer / H ¼ Moreton subsidiary manager / T
¼ Construction Projects subsidiary manager / R ¼ internal consultant
(translated from the Dutch by the author)
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